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Post-Mortem Pregnancy: A Proposed Methodology

for the Resolution of Conflicts Over Whether a
Brain Dead Pregnant Woman Should be Maintained
on Life-Sustaining Treatment
Alexis Gregorian*
INTRODUCTION

On May 7, 2005, Susan Torres collapsed from a stroke owing to a
cancerous tumor that had developed at the top of her spinal cord.1 Soon
after, doctors declared that she had suffered brain death. 2 In the forty-three
other states that have adopted the Uniform Determination of Death Act, this
meant that she was legally dead.3 She was approximately seventeen weeks
pregnant.4 Her husband, Jason Torres, felt very strongly that his wife would

* Juris Doctor expected May 2010, University of Virginia School of Law. I am grateful to
Professor Lois Shepherd for her valuable suggestions and encouragement. I would also like
to thank my family and friends for their feedback throughout the process of writing this
article. Finally, thank you to the members of the Annals of Health Law who helped to refine
the final draft.
1. Stephanie McCrummen, Inside Stricken Mother, a Race Between Life and Death;
Cancer That Felled Woman Now ThreatensFetus, WASH. POST, June 17, 2005, at Al.
2. Id.
3. The Uniform Determination of Death Act was proposed by the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, which followed the Harvard Medical School Ad Hoc Committee's
recommendations in this matter and provided a model for legislating the brain-cessation
criterion as legal death. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MED. & BIOMED. & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH: REPORT ON THE MEDICAL,

LEGAL, AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH 24, 53 (1981),
http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/past-commissions/defining death.pdf. This model was
endorsed by the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association, id. at 73,
and has been adopted in various forms of legislation by forty-three states, NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH

ACT, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact factsheets/uniformacts-fs-udda.asp. Section
1 states that "[a]n individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory
and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain,
including the brain stem, is dead." UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12A U.L.A.

781 (1980).
4. Richard Willing & Wendy Koch, 'Devastating Loss': Baby Born to Brain-Dead
Woman Dies, USA TODAY, Sept. 12, 2005, at Al.
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have wanted to be kept on life-sustaining treatment 5 to allow the fetus to
reach at least twenty-five weeks, the earliest date doctors felt that a
successful cesarean delivery would be possible. In fact, the doctors
maintained Susan Torres on life-sustaining treatment until the fetus reached
twenty-seven weeks and was delivered, weighing one pound and thirteen
ounces.7 Tragically, the infant did not survive.8 The Torres case is notable
for its rarity: since 1979, English language medical literature contains only
eleven cases of irreversibly brain-damaged women who have been
maintained on life-sustaining treatment to benefit a developing fetus. 9 The
Torres case is also notable for its lack of controversy.
Nineteen years earlier, Donna Piazzi was found in a public restroom,
unconscious, not breathing, and sixteen weeks pregnant.10 Eventually,
doctors pronounced her brain dead.11 Her husband asked that she be
removed from life-sustaining treatment. 12 A second man, the undisputed
biological father of the fetus, insisted that she be maintained on lifesustaining treatment. 13 The hospital sought a declaratory judgment in a
Georgia Superior Court to continue treatment until the fetus reached
viability and could be delivered via cesarean section.1 4 The court granted
the declaratory judgment. 15 Assuming Donna Piazzi did not have an
advance directive expressing a contrary preference, and because the
biological father was in favor of maintaining the mother on life-sustaining
16
treatment, the result the court reached was likely the most appropriate.
The court's order, however, was not based on Donna Piazzi's or the
5. Richard Willing, Woman Is Kept Alive to Save Unborn Baby, USA TODAY, June 16,
2005, at Al. The Palliative Care and Ethics Committees at Froedtert Hospital in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin define life-sustaining treatment as "[m]edical interventions used to prolong life,"
listing the following as examples: mechanical ventilation, kidney dialysis, artificial nutrition
(feeding tubes, TPN), artificial hydration, medications for blood pressure support (pressors),
antibiotics, blood products, and cardio-pulmonary resuscitation." PALLIATIVE CARE &
ETHICS

COMMS.,

MANAGING

CONFLICTS

CONCERNING

REQUESTS

TO

WITHHOLD

OR

WITHDRAW LIFE-SUSTAINTNG MEDICAL TREATMENT 1, http://www.capc.org/tools-forpalliative-care-programs/clinical-tools/clinical-guidelines/withhold-conflict-mgmt.pdf.
6. Willing, supra note 5.
7. Stephanie McCrummen, Brain-DeadMother is Taken Off Life-Support, WASH. POST,
Aug. 4, 2005, at Al.

8. id.
9. Id.
10. James M. Jordan, Incubatingfor the State: The PrecariousAutonomy of Persistently
Vegetative andBrain-DeadPregnantWomen, 22 GA. L. REv. 1103, 1108 (1988).
11. ld.at 1109.
12. Id.
13. Univ. Health Servs. Inc. v. Piazzi, No. CV86-RCCV-464 (Ga. Super. Ct. Aug. 4,
1986), reprintedin 2 ISSUES L. & MED. 415,415 (1987).
14. Id. at415-16.

15.

Id.

16.

See id. at 416.
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biological father's preferences. 17 Rather, the court based its decision on the
state's interest in preserving potential life. 18 The court held that Donna
Piazzi's right of privacy was extinguished by brain death, that no one other
than the pregnant woman can consent to the termination of pregnancy, and
that the right to terminate life-sustaining treatment is suspended during
19
pregnancy in accordance with the state's natural death statute.
Thus, while the outcome may have been appropriate, the Piazzi court's
legal conclusions effectively sanction the state to take possession of a brain
dead pregnant woman's body for use as an incubator, regardless of whether
her preferences or her family's preferences are to the contrary. 20 This article
suggests a more appropriate methodology for courts to use in resolving
conflicts over whether to maintain a post-mortem pregnant woman on lifesustaining treatment. Because of the rarity of post-mortem pregnancy and
the consequent absence of case law on the matter, much of the proposed
methodology results from analogy to related areas of the law.
Part I of this article endeavors to directly refute the Piazzi court's first
holding by demonstrating that interests are not extinguished upon death; in
fact, multiple legal premises rely on the legal fiction that the dead have
interests deserving of posthumous protection. This Part concludes that the
legal fiction extends to the interests of post-mortem pregnant women in
refusing medical treatment. Part II proceeds by exploring two areas of the
law in which the interests of pregnant women and the state are in tension:
abortion and forced cesarean sections. This Part focuses on the rights and
the temporal framework laid out in both the Supreme Court and lower
courts' decisions and argues for their applicability in cases of post-mortem
pregnancy. Part III articulates a proposed methodology courts should
employ in cases of conflict over whether to remove a post-mortem pregnant
woman from life-sustaining treatment, drawing on the abortion temporal
framework and accounting for a post-mortem pregnant woman's interests,
her family's interests, and the state's interests.
I. THE RIGHTS OF THE DEAD
For a dead man is popularly believed to be capable of experiencing both
good and ill fortune - honor and dishonor and prosperity and the loss of it
among his children and descendants generally - in exactly the same way as
if he were alive but unaware or unobservant of what was happening.21
17.

See id.

18.

Id.

19.
20.

Id.
Jordan, supra note 10, at 1112.

21.

DANIEL SPERLING, POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 16

(2008) (quoting Aristotle).
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A. Legal Fiction
A proposed methodology for courts to use in resolving conflicts over
post-mortem pregnancy must weigh competing interests. The first and most
important question that courts must address is whether the post-mortem
pregnant woman has interests that can be infringed upon by surviving
parties or the state.22 Many scholars have answered no.23 These scholars
argue that upon death, patients cease to be people in the eyes of the law, and
thus their right to determine what happens to their bodies no longer exists.24
Similarly, the Piazzi court held that a mother's right of privacy is
extinguished upon brain death.2 5 This Part argues that while brain death
ends a person's existence, the law promotes the fiction that the dead retain
interests, which command both respect and protection.
1. Philosophical Underpinnings
The posthumous retention of interests has engendered vigorous debate
among philosophers. 26 Two in particular, Joel Feinberg and Ernest
Partridge, have academically sparred over the concept. 27 While Feinberg
and Partridge fundamentally disagree over whether the dead have
"interests" that can be "harmed," they both arrive at the conclusion that the
wishes and commitments of the dead should be respected, albeit via
different routes.2 8
29
Feinberg asserts that the dead have interests capable of being harmed.
He claims that while the deceased cannot experience subjective satisfaction
from the fulfillment of their wants, each individual has objective interests
that survive beyond his existence.30 Posthumous interests exist in relation to
22.

Anne Reichman

Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous

Procreation,75 N.C. L. REV. 901, 935 (1997).
23. See Nicola S. Peart et al., Maintaining a Pregnancy Following Loss of Capacity, 8
MED. L. REv. 275, 291 (2000); Daniel Sperling, MaternalBrain Death, 30 AM. J.L. & MED.

453, 479 (2004) (citing David R. Field et al., Maternal Brain Death During Pregnancy:
Medical and Ethical Issues, 260 JAMA 816, 821 (1988)); Norman Fost & Laura M. Purdy,
Case Study: The Baby in the Body, 24 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 31, 32 (1994).

24.
25.

Peart et al., supra note 23, at 291.
Univ. Health Servs. Inc. v. Piazzi, No. CV86-RCCV-464 (Ga. Super. Ct. Aug. 4,

1986), reprintedin 2 ISSUES L. & MED. 415,418 (1987).

26. Compare JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 83 (1984), with Ernest Partridge, Posthumous Interests and Posthumous Respect, 91
ETHICS 243, 243-44 (1981), Joan C. Callahan, On Harming the Dead,97 ETHICS 341, 341-42
(1987), and Barbara Baum Levenbook, Harming Someone After His Death, 94 ETHICS 407,
409 (1984).
27. Feinberg, supranote 26.
28. Schiff, supra note 22, at 937, 939.
29. Feinberg, supranote 26.
30. Joel Feinberg, Harm and Sel-Interest, in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 285, 304 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds.,1977).
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other people.31 In the case of defamation, posthumous defamatory
statements can harm a dead person's interest in maintaining a good
reputation because his interests extend to future events.32 That is, a person's
interest in the way others regard him is harmed when he is posthumously
defamed.33 Feinberg argues further that a person, alive or dead, can be
harmed even if he is unaware of the harm.34 He claims that a defamatory
statement harms a living person's reputational interest even if the statement
is made in a remote location and the subject of the defamation is unaware of
the statement. 35 If the living can be harmed by statements of which they are
unaware, certainly the dead can be harmed as well. 36 According to
Feinberg, the interests of the dead are violated through defamation, broken
37
promises, or the abrogation of wills.
Partridge rejects Feinberg's posthumous harm theories as well as the idea
that the dead retain interests, stating that "objective conditions are
'interests' only insofar as they matter to someone." 38 Further, once a person
no longer has the capacity to gain or lose personal fulfillment from a
relationship, he can no longer be affected. 39 As such, any relational interest
is extinguished upon death. 40 Finally, Partridge claims that a person, alive
or dead, cannot be harmed if he is unaware of the harm.41 Partridge does
concede, however, that there are other reasons for honoring the wishes of
the dead aside from avoiding harm to their interests.4 2 He claims that the
living have a personal interest in respecting the dead, which he admits is
"self-regarding. 4 3 If wills are routinely violated simply because the dead
cannot be harmed, no one can feel secure that his own posthumous wishes
will be respected.44 Thus, while Partridge does not agree with Feinberg's
theory that posthumous interests exist and are capable of being harmed, he
does maintain that the
interests of the living are best preserved by
"posthumous respect." 45
Whether one agrees with Feinberg or Partridge on the issue of "harm" to
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 305.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 306.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Partridge, supra note 26, at 247.
Id.
Id.at 249.
Id.at 251.
Id.at 261.
Id.at 262.
Id.at 260-61.
Id.at 264.
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posthumous "interests," the result with respect to effectuating the wishes of
the dead is the same: both philosophers agree that the commitments and
expressed preferences of the dead should be honored. 46 Feinberg arrives at
this conclusion by asserting that the dead have interests; 47 Partridge does so
by asserting that the mental well-being of the living is promoted through
upholding the wishes of the dead.4 8 Both philosophers thus seem to endorse
the idea that legal institutions should maintain the fiction that the dead have
interests so that the wishes of the living are respected after death.49 In fact,
Feinberg explicitly states, "if the idea of an interest's surviving its
possessor's death is a kind of fiction, it is a fiction that most living men
have a real interest in preserving., 50 The American legal system does, in
fact, promote this fiction in numerous areas of the law.5 1
2. The Law of Wills
The law of wills exemplifies the legal system's promulgation of the
fiction that an individual's interests survive death.52 Wills provide
individuals with autonomy in controlling their possessions after death, as
exhibited by the freedom of testation, which "refers to the liberty which an
owner of property has to dispose of his or her property after death to the
persons or institutions the decedent prefers. 5 3 Further, the law does not
grant courts the authority to question the decedent's decisions about how to
allocate his property so long as the disposition does not violate an
overriding rule of law.5 4 The law thus respects the wishes of the living
testator as to the disposition of his property after death and affords latitude
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Schiff, supra note 22, at 935-37.
Id. at 935.
Id. at 939.
Id.
Id. at 937 (citing Joel Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, in
PHILOSOPHY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 43, 57-60 (William T. Blackstone ed., 1974)); see
also Callahan, supra note 26, at 351-52 ("As for maintaining these fictions in our legal
institutions, Partridge and Feinberg have offered several good reasons for keeping themreasons which appeal to the interests of the living-and I see no cause for not letting these
benefits and ways of showing respect to the living justify maintaining these fictions in our
legal system.").
51. Schiff, supra note 2322, at 937.
52. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
(2003) ("The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a donative document
is the donor's intention. The donor's intention is given effect to the maximum extent allowed
by law."); Callahan, supra note 26, at 351-52 (concluding that our legal institutions are well
justified in maintaining the fiction that the dead retain interests that can be harmed).
53. Tanya K. Hernandez, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 971, 976 n.24
(1999) (citing WILLIAM M. McGovERN, JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 3.1
(1988)).
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. c (2003).
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in deciding how to transfer his property.5 5
Clearly, if the dead have interests, as Feinberg claims, these interests will
extend to the manner in which private property is transferred.5 6 Abrogation
of a deceased's will constitutes a harm to the deceased's interest in
controlling his proprietary legacy.57 Even if the dead do not retain interests,
as Partridge argues, 58 the law of wills' respect for the wishes of the dead
supports the interests of the living who want their wishes respected after
59
death as well.
Aside from the existence of posthumous interests or the interests of
living testators, there may be other rationales for respecting the wishes of
the dead through the law of wills. Perhaps the transfer of property through a
will is simply the least objectionable arrangement for dealing with property
after its owner's death. Or maybe respecting the wishes of dead donors
supports the interests of a different subset of the living: the donees. All are
plausible rationales, and it is unnecessary to choose just one. The important
point is that by enforcing the testator's stated preferences regarding the
disposition of his private property, the law of wills promotes the fiction that
the dead retain interests, no matter the underlying rationale.6 °
3. Organ Donation
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), adopted by all fifty states
and the District of Columbia in some form, 6 1 operates similarly to the law
of wills in that it authorizes a living person to make a gift of all or part of
his own body after death.62 This gift is made through a will or the execution
of a document signed by the donor in the presence of two witnesses. 63 In the
absence of a will or other document manifesting the decedent's intent, the
UAGA grants families the power to donate their loved one's body after

55. Hernandez, supra note 53, at 976-77.
56. See Feinberg, supra note 30, at 306 (discussing the harm to a decedent's heirs in the
event that his will is overturned).
57. See id.
58. Partridge, supra note 26, at 244.
59.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1

(2003); Partridge, supra note 26, at 261.
60. Callahan, supra note 26, at 352.
61. See REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT annots. (amended 2006), 8A U.L.A. 33
(Supp. 2009) (adopted by thirty-four states). The other seventeen states adopted either the
1968 or 1987 version of the Act. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT annots. (amended 2006),
8A U.L.A. 3, 69 (2003).
62. REVISED UNwF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 5 (amended 2006), 8A U.L.A. 65 (Supp.
2009); see also Radhika Rao, Property,Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REv. 359,
378 (2000) (discussing the right under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act to donate body parts
through a will).
63.

REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 5 at 65.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2010

7

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 19 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 6

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 19

death, provided there is no actual notice that the decedent had contrary
preferences.64
Thus, the UAGA grants living individuals the autonomy to decide what
will become of their bodies after death.65 The fact that the law (and
hospitals) respects these autonomous decisions postmortem, at least in
theory, furthers the fiction that the dead retain interests. 66 Granted, the welldocumented primary purpose behind the passage of the UAGA was to
increase the supply of available organs for transplant to the living.6 7
However, if increasing the supply of organs was the sole consideration
behind the composition of the UAGA, arguably there would be less
emphasis placed on the intent of the deceased donor. Rather, the UAGA
emphasizes the autonomy interest of the decedent by promoting the
decedent's expressed wishes regarding organ donation over the wishes of
any other party.68
Organ donation laws, while contributing to the supply of organs
available for transplant, promote the legal fiction that posthumous interests
deserve protection. 69 This may be because the dead actually retain interests
or because there is a psychological benefit to people in knowing that society
will honor their wishes about the use of their bodies after death.70
4. Attorney-Client Privilege
The legal fiction of posthumous interests is also manifested in case law
supporting the position that the attorney-client privilege survives the
client's death. In Swidler & Berlin v. United States, Supreme Court Justices
espoused the views of both Partridge and Feinberg, and a majority of the
Court held that lawyers may not be compelled to reveal communications
71
with clients in a criminal proceeding, even after the death of the client.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held a view

64. Id. § 9 at 78 (identifying the individuals, in order of priority, who can donate the
decedent's body).
65. See Rao, supra note 62, at 379.
66. Schiff, supra note 22, at 929. There is evidence that when the donor's wishes
conflict with those of the surviving family members, health care professionals routinely
favor the family's preferences despite the fact that, under the UAGA, preferences of
surrogates should not be considered dispositive when a donor has made his or her preference
clear; see Bethany Spielman, Surrogates andRespectfor Donors, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 18, 1819 (2003) (arguing that while surrogates should not be completely excluded from the
decision-making process, they should be consulted only when the donor has no directive or
when the directive is unclear).
67. Schiff, supra note 22, at 928.
68. Id. at 928-29.
69. Id.
70. Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, 16 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 28, 30 (1986).
71. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410 (1998).
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consistent with Partridge's position.72 Chief Justice Rehnquist did not claim
that the dead have the same interests or privileges as the living. 73 However,
Justice Rehnquist laid out an important consideration in favor of applying
the attorney-client privilege posthumously: living clients will want to guard
against posthumous disclosure during their lifetimes owing to concerns
about "reputation, civil liability, or possible harm to family or friends." 74 If
confidential communications do not remain so after death simply because
the client is no longer alive, then living clients will
have less incentive to
75
lawyers.
their
to
information
confidential
disclose
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the dissent, held a view
consistent with Feinberg.76 In arguing that the decedent's reputational
interest should be weighed against the law enforcement's need for
information, Justice O'Conner stated that a decedent has such an interest:
"In my view, a criminal defendant's right to exculpatory evidence or a
compelling law enforcement need for information may... override a
client's posthumous interest in confidentiality." 77 By protecting a client's
confidential communications even after death, the attorney-client privilege
appears to support the legal system's fictitious attribution of interests to the
dead.
5. Defamation Law
Interestingly, although Feinberg uses defamation to demonstrate that the
dead have interests, 78 no cause of action exists for defamation of the dead at
common law. 79 In adopting the common law approach, courts have
articulated three rationales for rejecting laws that would provide
compensation for defamation of the dead: (1) the cause of action for
defamation rests on harm to personal reputation, which does not survive
death, (2) the limits of this cause of action would be difficult to establish, or
(3) a cause of action for defamation of the dead would "chill" historical

72. See id. at 407; Partridge, supra note 26, at 261 (stating that the living expect their
wills to be honored after death).
73. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 405 (holding that the attorney-client privilege
survives death but not discussing other interests or privileges).
74. Id. at 407.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 412 (holding that the deceased maintain personal, reputational, and economic
interests); Feinberg, supra note 30, at 304-05 (stating that the deceased maintain an interest
in having a good reputation or in having their loved ones flourish).
77. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 411 (emphasis added).
78. Feinberg, supra note 30, at 305-08.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 560 cmt. a (1977) ("The interest of the
descendants or other relatives of a deceased person in his good name is not given legal
protection by the common law.").
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research. 80 The first rationale, in particular, appears to refute the contention
that the dead have interests.
While as many as twenty-one states have criminal defamation statutes,81
many which retain the offense of "blackening the memory of the dead,"
these laws are not aimed at protecting the interests of the dead nor the "selfregarding" interests of the living by ensuring that they will not be defamed
upon death.82 Rather, these laws were designed to maintain peace and order
as defamatory statements tend to incite violence.8 3 Accordingly, truth was
not considered a defense when criminal defamation laws were first
promulgated. 84 After all, true defamatory statements could cause as much
violence as false ones.8 5
Many scholars have called for the creation of a private right of action for
defamation of the dead.8 6 Some state legislatures appear to be heeding their
calls, at least regarding defamation suits filed before a plaintiff's death.87 At
least ten states have statutes allowing the survival of all causes of action. 88
In half of those states, judicial interpretations of these survival statutes have
allowed defamation actions to survive the plaintiff's death.8 9
Despite the existence of criminal defamation of the dead laws and a call
for civil defamation of the dead laws in academia, private parties still have
no recourse when the dead are defamed. At first glance, this state of the law
80. Lisa Brown, Note, Dead but Not Forgotten: Proposalsfor Imposing Liability for
Defamationof the Dead, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1525, 1530 (1989).
81. Raymond Iryami, Note, Give the Dead Their Day in Court: Implying a Private
Cause of Action for Defamation of the Deadfrom Criminal Libel Statutes, 9 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1083, 1109 (1999).
82. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-13-105 (West 2009) (making it a felony to
"knowingly publish or disseminate, either by written instrument, sign, pictures, or the like,
any statement or object tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead"); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-4801 (West 2009); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 200.510 (West 2008); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 12.1-15-01 (West 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1441 (West 2009); TEX.
Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-2-2 (West
2009).
83. Iryami, supra note 81 at 1105-06.
84. Id. at 1105.
85. Id.at 1106.
86. Brown, supra note 80, at 1567; Iryami, supra note 81, at 1124; Florence Frances
Cameron, Note, Defamation Survivability and the Demise of the Antiquated "Actio
Personalis" Doctrine, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1833, 1852 (1985). Such reform would likely
occur at the state legislative level, similar to the development of wrongful death statutes. The
common law did not recognize a private right of action for wrongful death but today, every
state has enacted a wrongful death statute that enables specific beneficiaries to recover
damages for losses resulting from the victim's death. Mamta K. Shah, Note, Inconsistencies
in the Legal Status of an Unborn Child. Recognition of a Fetus as Potential Life, 29
HOFSTRA L. REv. 931, 933-34 (2001).
87. Cameron, supra note 86, at 1836.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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appears to contradict the contention that the legal system promotes the
fiction that the dead retain interests. After all, if this fiction exists, would it
not extend to protection of the reputational interests of the dead? While this
is a valid criticism, the absence of a private right of action for defamation of
the dead does not eviscerate the legal fiction theory, but rather, limits its
scope.
A key distinction exists between defamation and the other areas of the
law examined thus far that promote the legal fiction of posthumous
interests. The law of wills, the UAGA, and the attorney-client privilege all
arguably promote respect for the dead's wishes and confidential
communications. The living are then encouraged to create wills, sign donor
cards, and confide openly in their attorneys while feeling psychologically
secure that upon death, these actions and confidences will be honored. This
is the so-called "self-regarding" approach that Partridge articulated;
individuals respect the wishes and communications of others after death to
ensure that their own wishes and
communications will receive the same
90
treatment after their own deaths.
This "self-regarding" approach is inapplicable in the defamation context
because the defamed individual took no action prior to death deserving of
posthumous respect and protection. Abrogation of a will, unauthorized
removal of organs, or disclosure of confidential communications directly
violates what the deceased, while alive, explicitly or implicitly preferred
and understood was to become of her property, body, and communications
after death. In contrast, defamation violates no such preference or
understanding. Most people likely do not want their reputation
posthumously marred. Yet there is no document or privilege protective of
that desire, creating the expectation that this preference will be honored
after death.
The absence of a private cause of action for defamation of the dead may
stand for the legal system's rejection of Feinberg's posthumous rights
theories. However, it does not invalidate the legal fiction concept, but rather
limits it to posthumous protection of interests that a living individual
expects will be honored after her death. This legal fiction, thus limited, has
important implications for post-mortem pregnant women. 91

90. Partridge, supra note 26, at 261.
91. This legal fiction will also have important implications for recently deceased men in
the context of sperm retrieval. Currently, there are no legal restrictions on post-mortem
sperm retrieval, which means that a man's living preferences regarding procreation could be
disregarded after his death. See Judith F. Daar, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the
Pregnancy Process: Developing an Equality Model to Protect Reproductive Liberties, 25
AM. J. L. & MED. 455,459 n.42 (1999) (citing Schiff, supra note 22, at 923). This Paper is
concerned with post-mortem pregnant women and accordingly will not address the related
issue of post-mortem sperm retrieval.
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B. Interests of a Post-Mortem Pregnant Woman
If the American legal system promotes the fiction that interests will be
protected after death, this fiction should extend to the right to refuse
medical treatment, even for pregnant women. In Cruzan v. Missouri
Department of Health, the Supreme Court faced the question of whether the
Constitution grants individuals the "right to die., 92 The Court declared
guardedly that "the principle that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be
inferred from our prior decisions." 93 The Court's answer was qualified
because, while it assumed that the Constitution grants individuals the right
to refuse "lifesaving hydration and nutrition," it simultaneously upheld a
Missouri statute preventing withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment
unless the individual's intentions were proved 94
by clear and convincing
evidence, which in the instant case, they were not.
After the Court declared that a liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment existed, Congress promulgated the Uniform Health Care
Decisions Act (UHCDA) in 1993. 95 Only nine states have adopted the
UHCDA, 96 however all states now have legislation governing the
requirements of advance directives. 97 In most states, this98 legislation is
known as the "Natural Death Act" or the "Living Will Act.,
An advance directive is very similar to a will; in fact, advance directives
are commonly known as "living wills." 99 An advance directive enables a
competent individual to make decisions about medical treatment should the
individual become incompetent. This fornat should seem familiar; an
individual is able to make future decisions regarding her health and codify
these decisions in a document, which she can expect will be respected by
the law as clear and convincing evidence of her intentions. While advance
directives typically apply to the living yet incompetent, they are arguably
triggered by brain death as well. 100 However, even if advanced directives do
not apply to situations of brain death by their terms, the legal fiction of
92. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,277 (1989).
93. Id. at 278.
94. Id. at 285.
95. Bretton J. Horttor, A Survey of Living Will and Advanced Health Care Directives,74
N.D. L. REv. 233, 233-34 (1998).
96. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT annots., 9 Pt. TB U.L.A. 49 (Supp. 2009).
97. Horttor, supra note 95, at 233.
98. See id. at 239-92 (surveying state advance directives).
99. See id. at 233, 293.
100. Janice McAvoy-Snitzer, Note, Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will Statutes, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 1280, 1294 (1987); see also Archimandrite Makarios Griniezakis, Legal and
Ethical Issues Associated with Brain Death, 23:2 ETHICS & MED.

113, 114 (2007)

("Advanced directives do offer insight into whether or not a [brain dead] person wants to
donate his/her organs, and it may even prohibit the use of life support.").
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posthumous interests applies: the patient, while competent, created an
advance directive regarding the physical care she desired with the
expectation that it would be respected once she was no longer able to
articulate those desires herself. Individuals have the "self-regarding"
incentive to respect the advance directives of others to ensure that their
advance directive will be honored as well.
Accordingly, the interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment extends
posthumously to the brain dead, who, while competent, created an advance
directive. The usual restriction on who can create an advance directive is
limited to eighteen-year-olds of sound mind. 10 1 Consequently, upon brain
death, any individual of eighteen years or older, who created an advance
directive while of sound mind, has a posthumous interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment. This fiction extends to pregnant women who
meet these criteria and thus have a posthumous interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment. This interest, however, is not unlimited, and
like all interests, it must be considered against competing interests.
II. BALANCING TESTS

Courts regularly balance competing interests. In both the abortion and
forced cesarean contexts, courts have assessed and weighed the interests of
pregnant women against the interests of the fetus and the interests of the
state. 0 '
A. Abortion Precedent
Any discussion of post-mortem pregnancy will necessarily be informed
by the United States Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence. The Court
has adjudicated challenges to state restrictions on a woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy. 10 3 In these decisions, the Court has articulated the
competing interests implicated by these state restrictions and applied a
temporal framework to determine when certain interests dominate others.
The Court first formulated this approach in Roe v. Wade 04 and later refined
05
it in PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvaniav. Casey.1

1. Roe v. Wade
Under the pseudonym of Jane Roe, an unmarried woman, who wished to
101. See Horttor, supra note 95, at 239-92 (demonstrating that, in most states, only
individuals of eighteen years or older may sign an advance directive).
102. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)
(abortion); In re A.C., 572 A.2d 1235, 1237, 1251 (D.C. 1990) (forced cesarean).
103. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
104. Roe,410U.S. at 164-65.
105. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878-79.
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terminate her pregnancy, sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas
criminal abortion statutes, which prohibited procuring or attempting an
abortion except for the purpose of saving the mother's life, were
unconstitutional. 10 6 The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas ruled in Roe's favor but denied her application for
injunctive relief under the abstention doctrine.10 7 On direct appeal, the
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's holding that the Texas criminal
abortion statutes were unconstitutional because the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause implies a "right of privacy ... broad
enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
10 8
pregnancy.
The Court, however, held that this right of privacy, though broad enough
to include a woman's decision to obtain an abortion, is not absolute; at a
certain point, the right to privacy must be weighed against state interests. 10 9
The Court identified two relevant state interests as integral to this analysis:
(1) the interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant
woman, and (2) the interest in the potentiality of human life."0 Importantly,
the Court referred only to the state's interests and explicitly rejected the
notion that the unborn have interests under the Fourteenth Amendment."'
Because the Court found the right of privacy to be fundamental, any
legislation regulating this right could only be justified by a "compelling"
state interest. 112 The dual state interests at stake in the abortion context,
health of the mother and potentiality of human life, were found to grow in
substantiality the closer the woman grows to term. 113 At a certain
point
' 14
during the pregnancy, the state's interests become "compelling." "
In order to determine when that point occurs, the Court created a
trimester framework:
For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester,
the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it
chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably

106. Roe, 410 U.S. at 117, 118, 120.
107. Id. at 122. The district court abstained from granting injunctive relief due to the
federal policy against interference with state criminal investigations except in cases where
statutes are attacked for curbing free expression or for discouraging protected activities,
neither of which were alleged in this case. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1224 (N.D. Tex.
1970) (citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 489-90 (1965)).
108. Roe, 410 U.S. at 122, 153.
109. Id. at 154.
110. Id at 164-65.
111. Id. at 158.
112. Id. at 155.
113. Id. at 162-63.
114. Id. at 163.
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related to maternal health. For the stage subsequent to viability, the State
in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it
chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is
necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the
115
life or health of the mother.
The Court's decision in Roe was highly controversial and politically
significant; the ruling affected laws in forty-six states. 1 6 While the decision
has been the subject of much criticism in the twenty-five years since it was
handed down, the central holding has been upheld, most notably by the
1 17
Court's decision in Casey.
2. Planned Parenthood v. Casey
In Casey, five abortion clinics, one physician representing himself, and a
class of physicians who provided abortion services brought suit seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis that five provisions of the
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act were unconstitutional. 18 The provisions
included an informed consent rule with a twenty-four-hour waiting
requirement, a parental consent rule, a spousal notification rule, and
9
reporting requirements for facilities that provide abortion services. "
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
held that all five challenged provisions were unconstitutional and entered a
120
permanent injunction against the state's enforcement of the provisions.
The Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding all the
12 1
provisions constitutional except for the spousal notification rule.
A divided Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, expressly
maintaining the three-part holding of Roe v. Wade. 122 First, pre-viability, a
woman has the right to choose to have an abortion without undue
interference from the state because the state's interests are not strong
enough to support either the prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a
substantial obstacle to the woman's right to obtain an abortion. 123 Second,
post-viability, the state has the power to restrict abortions so long as the
restrictions contain exceptions for pregnancies that endanger the woman's
115. Id. at 164-65.
116. William Mears & Bob Franken, 30 Years After Ruling, Ambiguity, Anxiety
Surround Abortion Debate, CNN, Jan. 22, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/01/21/
roevwade.overview/ ("In all, the Roe and Doe rulings impacted laws in 46 states.").
117. Id.
118. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844-45 (1992).
119. Id. at 844.
120. Id. at 844-45.
121. Id. at 845.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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health or life. 124 Third, from the outset of the pregnancy, the state has
legitimate interests in both protecting the health of the woman and the
potentiality of life. 125
The plurality reaffirmed the fundamental right of privacy, which
"protects citizens against governmental intrusion in such intimate family
126
matters as procreation, childrearing, marriage, and contraceptive choice"
and held that these principles were properly applied in Roe to encompass a
woman's right to an abortion. 127 The Court went on to overturn the trimester
framework laid out in Roe and in its place, created a temporal framework
that draws a line at viability.1 28 The result of the Court's decision is that previability, a woman has the right to terminate her pregnancy. 129 However, the
state has the concurrent right to protect its interest in the potentiality of life
through measures designed to ensure that the woman's choice is informed,
so long as these measures do not pose an undue burden on her right.13 ° Postviability, the state may promote its interest in the potentiality of life by
regulating and even prescribing abortion except where
the procedure is
131
necessary to preserve the health or life of the mother.
Applying this framework to the challenged Pennsylvania provisions, the
plurality stated that the spousal notification provision violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by imposing an undue burden
on a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy.132 However, a majority of
the Justices found that the remaining provisions did not present due process
violations and upheld them.133
Roe's undisturbed identification of a woman's right to privacy, which
includes the decision to obtain an abortion as well as the state's compelling
interests in both the life of the mother and the potentiality of life, sets up a
tension between individual and state interests almost identical to that which
can arise in the situations of post-mortem pregnancy. 134 Importantly, the
pre- and post-viability line elaborated in Casey provides an important
framework that courts should apply in the post-mortem pregnancy
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.at 926-97.
127. Id.at 927.
128. Id.at 870, 873.
129. Id.at 870.
130. Id.at 878.
131. Id.at 879 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973)).
132. The Supreme Court stated that due process is guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id,at 869-70. The Court held that spousal consent is an undue burden, id.at
895, and that a state violates the Due Process Clause when it imposes an undue burden on a
woman's ability to have an abortion, id.at 895.
133. Id.at 900.
134. Roev. Wade, 410U.S. 113, 154(1973).
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B. Forced Cesareans
Another line of cases with important implications for conflicts over postmortem pregnancy deals with forced cesarean sections. Although rare, in
these cases a pregnant woman will go against her physician's
recommendation that she undergo a necessary cesarean section in order to
protect the health of the fetus, the mother, or both. 136 The physician then
turns to the courts to resolve the dilemma in what must inevitably be a
hastily conducted proceeding.1 37 In earlier cases, courts authorized the
cesarean sections over the mother's objections in order to save the life of
the fetus.1 38 More recent cases, however, place a greater emphasis on the
pregnant mother's right of privacy, including the right to refuse medical
1 39
treatment.
1. In re A.C.
A.C., a twenty-seven year old pregnant woman, was in the twenty-fifth
week of a high-risk pregnancy when doctors discovered a malignant tumor
in her lung. 140 As A.C.'s condition rapidly deteriorated, she agreed to
palliative care including intubation and heavy sedation, which prevented her
from communicating her preferences concerning her fetus. 141 The hospital
requested the trial court to order a cesarean section.1 42 The trial court
ordered the cesarean, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals denied
a motion to stay the trial court order. 143 The cesarean section was
performed, and tragically, both mother and child died shortly thereafter. 144
The court of appeals ordered a rehearing en banc and vacated the trial
court's order, holding that in almost all cases, the mother's decision
whether to consent to a cesarean section should be respected.1 4' The court
135. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.
136. Eric M. Levine, The Constitutionality of Court-Ordered Cesarean Surgery: A
Threshold Question, 4 ALB. L.J. ScI. & TECH. 229, 231 (1994).
137. Id. at 232.
138. See, e.g., In re Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding City Hosp., 274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (Ga.
1981) (per curiam) (affirming a court order compelling cesarean section); In re Madyun, 114
Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 2233 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1986), reprintedin In re A.C., 572 A.2d 1235,
1259, 1264 (D.C. 1990) (requiring cesarean surgery to be performed for the benefit of the
fetus).
139. See, e.g., In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 332 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
140. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1238 (D.C. 1990).
141. Id. at 1238-39.
142. Id. at 1238.
143. Id. at 1241.
144. Id.
145. Id.at 1237.
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extended this holding to incompetent patients, reasoning that incompetents
"have just as much right as competent patients to have their decisions made
while competent respected.' ' 146 Where a woman lacks decision-making
capacity and her wishes are unknown, her decision should be ascertained
through substituted judgment. 147 The court explicitly rejected a balancing
test between the mother's interests and the fetus' interests and heavily
emphasized the mother's right to forego medical treatment. 148 However, the
court did concede that there may be certain rare instances in which the
state's interests are so compelling that they force the mother's interests to
yield: "it would be an extraordinary case indeed in which a court might ever
be justified in overriding the patient's wishes and authorizing a major
surgical procedure. 149
2. In re Doe
The Illinois Appellate Court similarly refused to balance the mother's
right to refuse medical treatment against the interests of her fetus. 150 In this
case, Mother Doe, later identified as Tabita Bricci, refused to undergo a
cesarean section when her doctors informed her that her fetus was receiving
an inadequate supply of oxygen. 151 According to Mrs. Bricci's religious
beliefs, it was wrong to terminate a pregnancy before term, even by
cesarean section. 152 The circuit court refused to compel the cesarean and the
Illinois Appellate Court unanimously upheld this refusal. 153 Mrs.
Bricci
154
fortunately delivered a healthy baby without the cesarean section.
In this case, the Illinois Appellate Court held "that a woman's competent
choice in refusing medical treatment as invasive as a cesarean section
during her pregnancy must be honored, even in circumstances where the
choice may be harmful to her fetus." 155 The court based its decision on the
common law right to refuse medical treatment as well as the
constitutionally protected state right of privacy that extends to reproductive
autonomy and bodily integrity. 156 The court referenced the exception from
In re A. C. that in rare instances the state's interest may be so compelling as
146. Id.at 1246.
147. Id.at 1249.
148. Id.at 1247.
149. Id.at 1252.
150. In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
151. Id. at 327; Don Terry, Newborn Settles Caesarian Fight a Mother's Way, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 31, 1993, at A12.
152. In re Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 327.
153. Id.at 328, 335.
154. Id. at 329.
155. Id. at 330.
156. Id. at 330-331.
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to justify a cesarean section against the mother's will. 157 The Illinois
case so extraordinary as to afford
Appellate Court did not find the instant
158
weight.
great
such
interest
state's
the
Notably, In re Doe involved a fully competent woman who repeatedly
made her preferences known regarding the cesarean section procedure. The
court did not have the opportunity to decide the arguably more difficult
situation presented by a post-mortem pregnant woman. Nevertheless, the
D.C. and Illinois forced cesarean decisions inform the methodology that
courts should employ in these arguably more difficult situations.
III. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY FOR POST-MORTEM PREGNANCY

The foregoing sections stand for the propositions that: (1) the law creates
a fiction of posthumous protection of those interests that a living individual
expects to be honored after her death; (2) this legal fiction protects a postmortem pregnant woman's interests in refusing medical treatment; and (3)
this interest is not absolute-a court must weigh it against competing
interests much as the courts do in abortion and forced cesarean cases.
Because the Supreme Court has determined that viability establishes the
point at which the competing interests scale tips in favor of a state's interest
in the potentiality of life, 159 the methodology in this article advocates for
resolving conflicts over post-mortem pregnancy within the pre/post
viability framework.
A. Pre-Viability
A pregnant woman who suffers brain death before her fetus reaches the
point of viability1 60 deserves to have her interest in refusing medical
treatment respected, provided that she articulates this interest while she is
competent. The first Subsection will discuss the manner in which the courts
should weigh the competing interests of the state with the interests of the
mother when the mother has clearly stated her preferences regarding the
refusal of medical treatment while pregnant in an advance directive. The

157. Id. at 332.
158. Id. at 334.
159. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878-79 (1992);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
160. "Viability is defined as the ability of fetuses to survive in the extrauterine
environment." Keith L. Moore & T.V.N. Persaud, The Developing Human: Clinically
Oriented Embryology 103 (7th ed. 2003). "There is no sharp limit of development, age, or
weight at which a fetus automatically becomes viable or beyond which survival is assured,
but experience has shown that it is rare for a baby to survive whose weight is less than 500
gm or whose fertilization age is less than 22 weeks. Even fetuses born between 26 and 28
weeks have difficulty surviving, mainly because the respiratory system and the central
nervous system are not completely differentiated." Id.
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second Subsection will discuss the manner in which courts should weigh
the competing interests of the state with the interests of the mother in the
more likely scenario: when the mother has not created an advance directive,
or has created one but without specifically addressing her pregnancy.
1. Preferences of the Mother Clearly Stated
When a pregnant woman includes a provision in her advance directive
stating whether she wants to be maintained on life-sustaining treatment in
the event of incompetency or brain death during her pregnancy, the court
should uphold the mother's wishes, even if the consequence is the death of
both mother and fetus. The mother's interest in refusing medical treatment
deserves respect by both hospitals and courts. Although the mother is brain
dead, she specifically provided for this situation in her advance directive
and has an interest that the American legal system should protect.
Concededly, the state also has an interest in the potentiality of life, 161 but
because the fetus has not reached the point of viability, that interest is not
yet compelling and does not trump the woman's interest in refusing medical
treatment.
This outcome is inconsistent with the Natural Death Statutes of most
states. Most Natural Death Statutes include a pregnancy clause, which
states that an advance directive has no effect during pregnancy. 62 Indeed,
only three states reference something similar to the point of viability in their
pregnancy clauses. 163 In those three states, pregnancy nullifies the advance
directive, but only if it is possible that the fetus could develop to the point
64
of live birth with the continued application of life-sustaining treatment.1
However, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Casey regarding the
State's weakened interests in the potentiality of life pre-viability, a
substantive due process challenge to a Natural Death Statute's pregnancy
clause that does not account for viability would likely be successful, as a
pregnancy clause unduly burdens a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy through refusal of medical treatment. 165 Pre-viability, the state's
interest in keeping a brain dead woman on life-sustaining treatment against
her will is not compelling. 166 Accordingly, when a woman has explicitly
made her preferences known regarding pregnancy in an advance directive,
161. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878-79.
162. Horttor, supra note 95, at 293.
163. Id. at 238, 257, 269. Those states are Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-206
(West 2009); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A (West 2009); and Nebraska, NEB. Riv. STAT.
ANN.§ 20-403 (West 2009).
164. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-206 (West 2009); Horttor, supra note 97, at
238, 257, 269 (setting forth Arkansas', Iowa's, and Nebraska's point of viability clauses).
165. Jordan, supra note10, at 1154.
166. See id. at 1154-55.
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this preference should control.
2. Preference of the Mother Unknown
While doctors have attempted to increase the use of advance directives in
recent years, only a small percentage of the population has prepared
them. 167 Accordingly, it is unlikely that a post-mortem pregnant woman will
have prepared an advance directive and even more unlikely that it will
address what she wishes to happen in the event of pregnancy. Notably,
neither Susan Torres nor Donna Piazzi had advance directives.16 8 A treating
physician should not assume that a woman who drafted an advance
directive with no mention of pregnancy intended for it to control during
pregnancy. It is unreasonable to hold that a woman necessarily considered
the situation of brain death during pregnancy at the time of drafting her
advance directive.
Likewise, neither should a physician assume that because a woman was
pregnant at the time of brain death, she necessarily would have wanted the
pregnancy continued after her death. The fact that a woman did not have an
abortion prior to brain death does not mean she would have chosen to
continue the pregnancy. The woman may not have wished to produce a
motherless child and burden her grieving partner with the care of an infant.
She may not even have a partner. Additionally, she may not have wanted to
who would witness
extend the grieving process for her family and friends
1 69
her on life-sustaining treatment for weeks or months.
This dilemma can best be resolved in much the same way that similar
dilemmas are resolved in other end-of-life cases: through substituted
judgment. The substituted judgment standard allows a surrogate to make the
decision the surrogate believes the patient would have wanted. 170 This
standard requires "that the surrogate's decisions correspond to what the
incompetent patient would have preferred in advance of losing decisionmaking capacity had he or she given thought to the matter. Put most simply,
the substituted judgment standard seeks to determine the now-incompetent
patient's probable wishes concerning treatment." 171 Should the biological
father be married to the post-mortem pregnant woman, he will likely play a
key role in determining her probable wishes regarding her pregnancy as the
surrogate.
167. Glenn Cohen, NegotiatingDeath: ADR and End of Life Decision-making, 9 HARv.
NEGOT. L. REv. 253, 283 (2004).
168. McCrmnmen, supra note 1, at Al; Jordan, supra note 10, at 1109.
169. D. GARETH JONES, SPEAKING FOR THE DEAD: CADAVERS IN BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE
98 (2000).
170. Alan Meisel, Suppose the Schindlers Had Won the Schiavo Case, 61 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 733, 744-45 (2007).
171. Id.
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Ideally, the physician, the biological father, and the post-mortem
mother's other family members can reach a consensus regarding the postmortem mother's probable wishes and the best course of action with regard
to maintenance of, or removal from, life-sustaining treatment. Such was the
case with Susan Torres, and thus there was no need to involve the courts.
However, a trickier situation arises, as in the Donna Piazzi scenario, when
such a consensus
is not reached and the courts are consulted to resolve the
172
dispute.
In the Piazzi case, the biological father wanted the post-mortem mother
to be maintained on life-sustaining treatment until the fetus could develop
and be delivered by cesarean section.1 73 The mother's husband wanted her
removed from life-sustaining treatment. 74 Biological fathers cannot
override a competent woman's autonomous decisions regarding whether to
continue or terminate her pregnancy. 175 Additionally, the law disregards the
biological father when it comes to cesarean sections and blood transfusions
during pregnancy. 176 Accordingly, some scholars have argued that in cases
of post-mortem pregnancy, the biological father's role should be limited to
informing the inquiry as to what the mother would have wanted; he should
not make the final determination.1 77 When the post-mortem mother's wishes
can be discerned and her judgment properly substituted without controversy
or conflict, this approach is consistent with respect for her post-mortem
interests regarding refusal of medical treatment.
However, when the post-mortem mother's wishes are in dispute or
simply cannot be determined, as in the Piazzi case, 178 the biological father's
interests and role are deserving of greater weight. When the mother is
competent and making autonomous decisions regarding her pregnancy, or
even when her wishes can be discerned through substituted judgment, her
interests are known and deserve protection over the interests of the
biological father. 179 However, when the mother's wishes are unknown and
cannot be determined, her judgment cannot be substituted and her interests
cannot be protected over the interests of the biological father. At that point,
courts should defer to the judgment of the biological father, giving his

172. Jordan, supra note 10, at 1198.
173. Univ. Health Servs. Inc. v. Piazzi, No. CV86-RCCV-464 (Ga. Super. Ct. Aug. 4,
1986), reprintedin 2 ISSUES L. & MED. 415,416 (1987).
174. Id.
175. Sperling, supra note23, at 491.
176. Id.
177. Id. ("The biological father should only be allowed to contribute to a full
understanding of [the woman's wishes and ideology regarding the pregnancy] and should be
allowed to reflect on these, not determine this understanding.").
178. See Piazzi, No. CV86-RCCV-464, reprintedin 2 Issues L. & Med. 415 (1987).
179. Sperling, supra note 21, at 491.
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preference priority. If the biological father is not involved or chooses not to
make the decision, it will fall to other family members. Such an approach
would function similarly to the UAGA, 180 allowing family members to
make end-of-life decisions for their loved ones in the absence of contrary
preferences.
B. Post-Viability
A pregnant woman who suffers brain death after her fetus reaches the
point of viability retains an interest in refusing medical treatment. However,
at the point of viability, the state's interest in the potentiality of life, in
accordance with Roe and Casey, becomes compelling and should be
accorded more weight than the post-mortem mother's interest in refusing
treatment. The framework provided by the Casey court mandates that postviability, the state's interest in the potentiality of life must yield only if the
181
continued pregnancy poses a danger to the health or life of the mother.
Obviously, in a situation involving a post-mortem pregnant woman,
concern for the health or life of the mother is no longer a factor.
Should a conflict arise over whether to maintain a post-mortem pregnant
woman on life-sustaining treatment post-viability, a court should resolve
the conflict in favor of the state's interest in potential life and order that the
woman be maintained on life-sustaining treatment until the fetus can be
safely delivered. Such a resolution is consistent with the Supreme Court's
abortion jurisprudence. Yet this resolution is not completely consistent with
the case law surrounding forced cesareans. The court in In re A. C. found
that it would be rare for a court to justifiably override a patient's wishes and
authorize a major medical procedure. 8 2 Granted, in the majority of postmortem pregnancies, the wishes of the mother will not have been stated in
an advance directive and will have to be gleaned through substituted
judgment. Even if the post-mortem pregnant woman provided for this
contingency in an advance directive, however, the court should find that
with post-viability, the scale tips in favor of the state's interest in potential
life. This outcome appears to be mandated by the Supreme Court's
decisions in Roe and Casey. Perhaps this is the type of rare instance the In
re A. C. court envisioned when it stated that the state might be justified in
overriding the patient's wishes, or perhaps not. Either way, the controlling
decision handed down by the Supreme Court states that post-viability, the
state has a compelling interest in the potentiality of life.183 Such a
180.
2009).

REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT

§ 9 (amended 2006), 8A U.L.A. 78 (Supp.

181.
182.

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1252 (D.C. 1990).

183.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
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compelling interest trumps a post-mortem pregnant woman's interest in
refusing medical treatment.
IV. CONCLUSION

On the rare occasions when courts are confronted with a conflict over
whether to maintain a brain dead pregnant woman on life-sustaining
treatment, they should employ a consistent methodology in resolving the
conflict and avoid decisions based on rationales like the Piazzi court's,
which essentially ignored both the wishes of the post-mortem mother and
her family. Pre-viability, courts should respect the wishes of the pregnant
woman, who retains interests after death in accordance with the fiction
promulgated by the American legal system. These wishes may be
manifested in an advance directive, but it is more likely than not that
physicians will have to ascertain the post-mortem mother's wishes through
the use of substituted judgment. In the event that no consensus is reached
regarding her wishes, the decision of whether to maintain the mother on
life-sustaining treatment should fall first to the biological father and then to
the rest of her family. Post-viability, the post-mortem pregnant woman
continues to retain an interest in refusing medical treatment; the state's
interest in the potentiality of life becomes compelling at this point in the
pregnancy, however, and will ultimately override her wishes to the
contrary. Situations of post-mortem pregnancy, like those confronted by
Susan Torres, Donna Piazzi, and their respective families, are tragic and
thankfully uncommon. When they do occur, however, courts should be
prepared to respect the rights of post-mortem pregnant women and their
families. This article proposes a methodology for doing so.
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